Chukwuemeka A. Nnabuife ACIS
INTRODUCTION
The political turmoil in Rivers State has reached a critical juncture, culminating in President Bola Ahmed Tinubu’s declaration of a state of emergency on 18th March, 2025 [1]. This drastic measure, which suspended Governor Siminalayi Fubara, Deputy Governor Ngozi Odu, and the Rivers State House of Assembly, replacing them with a sole administrator, has ignited a fierce debate about its legality under Nigeria’s constitutional framework. As of 25th March, 2025 [2], the nation grapples with questions of federal overreach, democratic integrity, and the balance of power between the central government and its federating units. This article explores whether Mr. President’s action constitutes a constitutional overstep by defining key terms, analyzing the crisis, and evaluating the declaration against the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria (as amended), concluding that it indeed exceeds constitutional bounds due to procedural flaws and an overextension of authority.
DEFINITION OF KEY TERMS
A constitution is the foundational legal document that establishes the structure, powers, and duties of a government while safeguarding the rights of its citizens. It serves as the supreme law, providing a framework for governance and resolving disputes between state and federal authorities (Nwabueze, 2003) [3]. In Nigeria, the 1999 Constitution (as amended) is the bedrock of the nation’s federal system, delineating the autonomy of states and the limits of presidential power.
A state of emergency is a temporary governmental measure invoked to address extraordinary threats such as war, rebellion, or natural disasters that endanger public safety or national stability. In Nigeria, Section 305 of the 1999 Constitution governs this process, outlining specific conditions and procedures to ensure it is not misused (Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999) [4]. This provision balances the need for decisive action with protection against authoritarianism.
BACKGROUND OF THE RIVERS STATE CRISIS
The crisis in Rivers State stems from a bitter rivalry between Governor Siminalayi Fubara and Nyesom Wike, his predecessor and current Minister of the Federal Capital Territory. This feud has fractured the state’s political landscape, with the Rivers State House of Assembly allegedly aligned with Wike attempting to impeach Fubara, leading to violent clashes and legislative paralysis. The situation worsened when unidentified militants bombed sections of the Trans-Niger Pipeline, a vital oil artery, raising national security concerns, given Rivers State’s economic significance (Akinola, 2025) [5]. Citing these developments, President Tinubu declared a state of emergency, appointing retired Vice Admiral Ibok-Ete Ibas as sole administrator for six months, a move he justified as necessary to restore order and protect Nigeria’s economy (Onanuga, 2025) [6].
On 18th March, 2025, President Tinubu stunned Nigeria with a nationwide broadcast, declaring a state of emergency in Rivers State. Citing a prolonged political crisis and alleged pipeline vandalism, he suspended Governor Siminalayi Fubara, his deputy Ngozi Odu, and the entire Rivers State House of Assembly for six months, appointing retired Vice Admiral Ibokette Ibas as administrator. This dramatic move has ignited a firestorm of debate: Does the president’s action align with Nigeria’s 1999 Constitution, or does it trample on the very democratic principles it claims to protect? As the oil-rich state reels from political turmoil, legal experts, statesmen, and past leaders have weighed in, exposing a rift between constitutional intent and executive action.
VOICES OF AUTHORITY: REACTIONS TO THE DECLARATION
The Nigerian Bar Association (NBA) [7], led by President Mazi Afam Osigwe, SAN, swiftly condemned the suspension of elected officials as unconstitutional. “Section 305 of the 1999 Constitution does not grant the President the power to remove an elected governor, deputy governor, or members of a state’s legislature under the guise of a state of emergency,” the NBA declared in a statement. They argue that such actions amount to “an unconstitutional usurpation of power and a fundamental breach of Nigeria’s federal structure.”
Constitutional lawyer Festus Ogun [8] echoed this sentiment, calling the move “executive lawlessness.” He told Pulse Nigeria, “No provision in the Constitution grants the President the power to suspend a sitting governor under any circumstances, including a state of emergency.” Ogun pointed to greater crises in states like Borno and Kaduna, where no such declarations were made, questioning the justification for Rivers.
Former President Goodluck Jonathan [9] , speaking at a colloquium in Abuja, warned that Tinubu’s actions “paint the country in a negative light” and could bring Nigeria into international disrepute. Jonathan, who declared emergencies in Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa in 2013 without suspending governors, emphasized that constitutional limits must be respected. Similarly, Nobel Laureate Wole Soyinka [10] criticized the declaration as “against the spirit of federalism,” urging a return to democratic norms.
Barrister Deji Adeyanju[11] likened the move to “a civilian coup,” arguing, “The Constitution is clear: only the courts or a duly followed impeachment process can remove a governor. If a president can suspend a governor via a press statement, then what stops the National Assembly from suspending the President?” The emergency powers under the 1999 Constitution do not give such powers to the President.”
SECTION 305: A MISSTEP IN INTERPRETATION?
President Tinubu anchored his declaration on Section 305 of the 1999 Constitution [12], which outlines the conditions for proclaiming a state of emergency. The section permits such a measure in cases of war, imminent invasion, a breakdown of public order requiring extraordinary measures, or natural disasters threatening the nation or a part thereof. Procedurally, the president must publish the proclamation in the Official Gazette and seek National Assembly approval within two days if in session (or ten days if not), as per Section 305(2). However, the Constitution is silent on suspending elected officials a gap that has fueled the controversy. In Rivers State, the crisis stems from a power struggle between Governor Fubara and his predecessor, Nyesom Wike, now the Minister of the Federal Capital Territory. The demolition of the State House of Assembly in December 2023, legislative defections, and factional infighting have paralyzed governance, culminating in a Supreme Court ruling on 28th February, 2025, that declared “there is no government in Rivers State” due to the absence of a functioning legislature. Tinubu cited this chaos and alleged pipeline attacks as justification for his emergency rule. Yet, critics argue that political disputes and isolated incidents of vandalism do not meet the threshold of a “breakdown of public order” necessitating such drastic federal intervention.
Section 305(5) allows the president to act if a governor fails to request emergency measures amid a crisis, but it does not authorize the removal of elected officials. The Constitution reserves governor removal for impeachment under Section 188, a process exclusive to the state legislature, not the presidency. Past precedents, like Jonathan’s 2013 emergency declarations, avoided suspending governors, reinforcing that emergency powers are meant to restore order, not dismantle democracy.
IS TINUBU’S DECLARATION A CONSTITUTIONAL OVERSTEP?
To assess the constitutionality of this declaration, we must examine it through the lens of Section 305 of the 1999 Constitution, which specifies both the conditions for declaring a state of emergency and the procedural steps required.
ARGUMENT: YES, IT IS A CONSTITUTIONAL OVERSTEP
Insufficient Grounds under Section 305 Section 305(3) permits a state of emergency only in extreme circumstances, such as war, external aggression, or a breakdown of public order and safety beyond the state’s capacity to manage (Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999) [13]. While the pipeline attacks and political unrest are serious, they do not clearly constitute a widespread collapse of order justifying emergency rule. Legal scholar Femi Falana argues that “the threshold for a state of emergency is exceptionally high, and isolated incidents of sabotage do not meet it” (Falana, 2025) [14]. The crisis appears more as a political dispute than an existential threat, suggesting an overreaction by the Presidency.
Procedural Non-Compliance The Constitution mandates that a presidential proclamation be submitted to the National Assembly within two days for approval by a two-thirds majority of both chambers (Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, Section 305(1)) [15]. Reports indicate that the National Assembly approved Tinubu’s declaration via a voice vote, a method criticized for lacking the transparency and rigor required to confirm the necessary supermajority (Eze, 2025) [16] . Constitutional analyst Chidi Odinkalu asserts that “a voice vote in such a contentious matter undermines the democratic process and the constitutional safeguard” (Odinkalu, 2025) [17], casting doubt on the declaration’s legality. Unauthorized Suspension of Democratic Institutions The suspension of elected officials and the appointment of a sole administrator exceed the powers granted under Section 305. The Constitution does not explicitly authorize the President to dissolve state governments or replace them with appointees during a state of emergency; rather, it envisions cooperation with existing structures to address the crisis (Falana, 2025) [18]. This action violates the federal principle of state autonomy and echoes the Supreme Court’s 2024 ruling affirming the independence of local and state governments (Mahmud, 2025)[19] . Falana describes it as “an unconstitutional power grab” that threatens Nigeria’s democratic fabric (Falana, 2025) [20].
COUNTERARGUMENT: NO, IT IS NOT A CONSTITUTIONAL OVERSTEP
Legitimate Exercise of Presidential Authority Proponents argue that Tinubu acted within his constitutional mandate. Section 305(3)(d) allows a state of emergency when “there is a clear and present danger” to public safety or national stability (Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999) [21]. The Presidency contends that the pipeline attacks, combined with political instability, posed such a danger, given Rivers State’s role in Nigeria’s oil production (Onanuga, 2025) [22] . Legal expert Yusuf Ali supports this, stating that “the President has the discretion to act preemptively to avert a national crisis” (Ali, 2025) [23].
Economic and Security Justification The economic implications of the crisis cannot be understated. With oil accounting for over 80% of Nigeria’s export revenue, disruptions in Rivers State threaten the nation’s fiscal stability (Akinola, 2025) [24]. The appointment of a military administrator reflects the urgency of securing critical infrastructure, aligning with the President’s duty to protect national interests (Onanuga, 2025) [25]. National Assembly Approval The Presidency insists that the declaration was ratified by the National Assembly, fulfilling Section 305’s procedural requirement (Ali, 2025) [26]. Supporters argue that a voice vote, while unconventional, is not explicitly prohibited, and the opposition has not proven a lack of two-thirds support (Onanuga, 2025) [27].
MY THOUGHTS: A DANGEROUS PRECEDENT
The chorus of condemnation from legal minds and elder statesmen suggests that Tinubu’s reliance on Section 305 is a stretch, if not an outright misadventure. The Rivers crisis, while severe, is a political quagmire, not a war, insurgency, or natural calamity as envisioned by the Constitution. Suspending an elected governor and legislature without clear constitutional backing smells of executive overreach, echoing the authoritarian tendencies of past military regimes rather than a democratic federation. The appointment of an unelected administrator further undermines the will of Rivers’ electorate, raising the specter of federal domination over state autonomy.
Tinubu’s own history adds irony to the saga. As Lagos State Governor in 2004 [28] , he opposed President Olusegun Obasanjo’s emergency declaration in Plateau State, calling it an affront to democracy. Today, his actions invite the same critique, suggesting political expediency may have trumped principle. If Wike’s influence as a Tinubu ally is indeed a factor, as some allege, it only deepens the perception of partisan abuse of power.
LESSONS LEARNED AND THE DEMOCRATIC FALLOUT
The Rivers crisis offers a stark lesson: constitutional ambiguity invites exploitation. Section 305’s lack of clarity on suspending elected officials has left room for interpretation, but the consensus among experts is that such actions require explicit legislative or judicial processes, not executive fiat. This episode underscores the need for constitutional reform to tighten emergency powers and prevent future misuse.
The effect on Nigeria’s democracy is chilling. If upheld, this precedent could empower any president to sideline opposition-led states under vague pretenses, eroding federalism and the rule of law. Public trust in democratic institutions, already fragile, risks further erosion as citizens witness elected mandates overturned by decree. The National Assembly’s swift approval of the declaration within 48 hours, as reported, raises questions about legislative oversight: Did lawmakers rigorously debate or merely rubber-stamp the president’s will?
For Rivers State, the immediate consequence is a governance vacuum, with an unelected administrator navigating a politically charged landscape. Nationally, the crisis tests Nigeria’s commitment to constitutionalism. The judiciary, likely the next battleground, must clarify these boundaries to safeguard democracy’s future. As Soyinka aptly noted, this is not just about Rivers; it’s about the soul of Nigeria’s federal system.
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION
While the arguments defending Tinubu’s declaration emphasize national security and economic stability, they falter under closer scrutiny. The conditions outlined in Section 305 require a more severe and pervasive threat than what Rivers State has exhibited; political infighting and isolated attacks do not equate to a breakdown of order on the scale envisioned by the Constitution. Procedurally, the opaque use of a voice vote fails to demonstrate compliance with the two-thirds majority requirement, weakening the declaration’s legitimacy. Most damningly, the suspension of elected officials and imposition of a sole administrator lack constitutional grounding, infringing on state autonomy and democratic norms. President Tinubu’s declaration of a state of emergency in Rivers State thus constitutes a constitutional overstep. It stretches the interpretation of Section 305 beyond its intended scope and bypasses critical safeguards, risking the erosion of Nigeria’s federal structure. As the judiciary prepares to weigh in, this episode underscores the need for stricter adherence to constitutional limits to preserve democratic governance.
Footnotes
[1] Tinubu, B. A. (2025, March 18). Nationwide Broadcast on Rivers State Emergency. Presidency of Nigeria Official Transcript.
[2] Vanguard. (2025, March 20). National Assembly Approves Rivers Emergency Declaration. Vanguard Newspaper. Retrieved from https://www.vanguardngr.com/news
[3] Nwabueze, B. (2003). Constitutional Democracy in Africa. Ibadan: Spectrum Books.
[4] Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. (1999). Retrieved from http://www.nigeria-law.org/ConstitutionOfTheFederalRepublicOfNigeria.htm
[5] Akinola, T. (2025, March 20). Rivers Crisis: Pipeline Attacks Escalate Tensions. The Guardian Nigeria.
[6] Onanuga, B. (2025, March 19). Tinubu Declares State of Emergency in Rivers to Protect National Economy. Punch Newspapers.
[7] NBA (Nigerian Bar Association). (2025, March 19). Press Statement on Rivers State Emergency Declaration. NBA Official Website.
[8] Ogun, F. (2025, March 20). Interview with Pulse Nigeria. Pulse Nigeria. Retrieved from https://www.pulse.ng/news/rivers-crisis-lawyer-slams-tinubu
[9] Jonathan, G. (2025, March 20). Speech at the National Colloquium on Democracy, Abuja. Reported by The Punch.
[10]Soyinka, W. (2025, March 21). Statement to the Press. Reported by ThisDay Newspaper.
[11] Adeyanju, D. (2025, March 19). Interview with Channels Television. Channels TV News.
[12] Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. (1999). Retrieved from http://www.nigeria-law.org/ConstitutionOfTheFederalRepublicOfNigeria.htm
[13] Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. (1999). Retrieved from http://www.nigeria-law.org/ConstitutionOfTheFederalRepublicOfNigeria.htm
[14] Falana, F. (2025, March 23). Tinubu’s Rivers Emergency Rule is Illegal. Premium Times Nigeria.
[15] Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. (1999). Retrieved from http://www.nigeria-law.org/ConstitutionOfTheFederalRepublicOfNigeria.htm
[16] Eze, C. (2025, March 21). Rivers Emergency: National Assembly’s Voice Vote Sparks Controversy. ThisDay Newspapers.
[17] Odinkalu, C. (2025, March 22). Constitutional Crisis in Rivers State. Vanguard Newspapers.
[18] Falana, F. (2025, March 23). Tinubu’s Rivers Emergency Rule is Illegal. Premium Times Nigeria.
[19] Mahmud, A. (2025, March 24). Rivers Crisis: A Test of Federalism. News Diary Online.
[20] Falana, F. (2025, March 23). Tinubu’s Rivers Emergency Rule is Illegal. Premium Times Nigeria.
[21] Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (1999). As amended.
[22] Onanuga, B. (2025, March 19). Tinubu Declares State of Emergency in Rivers to Protect National Economy. Punch Newspapers.
[23] Ali, Y. (2025, March 22). Tinubu’s Emergency Declaration is Constitutional – Legal Expert. Leadership Newspaper.
[24] Akinola, T. (2025, March 20). Rivers Crisis: Pipeline Attacks Escalate Tensions. The Guardian Nigeria.
[25] Onanuga, B. (2025, March 19). Tinubu Declares State of Emergency in Rivers to Protect National Economy. Punch Newspapers.
[26] Ali, Y. (2025, March 22). Tinubu’s Emergency Declaration is Constitutional – Legal Expert. Leadership Newspaper.
[27] Onanuga, B. (2025, March 19). Tinubu Declares State of Emergency in Rivers to Protect National Economy. Punch Newspapers.
[28] Tinubu, B. A. (2004). Statement on Plateau State Emergency. Historical Archive, Lagos State Government.
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